Education in “The Republic” & “Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”

The role and significance of grooming with check to g all overnmental and social institutions is a subject that has interested policy-making philosophers for millennia. In particular, the views of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, as evidenced in The Re popular, and of the pre-Romantic philosopher blue jean Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, present a smash juxtaposition of the two extremes of the ongoing philosophical and political debate over the function and value of preparation.In this paper, I volition argue that Rousseaus repudiation of information, while imperfect and offering no exempt to the ills it disparages, is superior inasmuch as it comes closer to the truth of things than does Platos idealized conceptions. To do so, I willing stolon examine Platos interpretation of the role of education and its function in defining the structure of hunting lodge and government and in producing reasoned citizens. I will then introduce Rousseau s view of education and the negative effects of the cultivate culture which it produces, and using this view, will attempt to illustrate the naivete and over-idealization of Platos notions.Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate that it is Rousseaus view, kinda than Platos, that is ultimately more epochal in assessing the actual (vs. idealized) merits (or lack thitherof, in Rousseaus case) by which education should be judged with regard to the nurturance of good citizens. For Plato, the question of the role of education arises near the can of Book II (377e), after a discussion of both the demand and consequent attributes of Socrates kallipolis or Ideal City.Such a city, Socrates argues, will, before long, accommodate need of both a specialization of labor (in stray for the superlative level of diversity and luxury of goods to be achieved) and of the establishment of a grade of defenders to encourage the city from its envious neighbors and maintain order within its walls ( i. e. , to law and govern the city). This, in turn, leads inexorably to the question of what attributes the Ideal City will require of its Guardians, and how best to foster such attributes.The early, childhood education of the Guardians, Socrates argues, is the key. What, then, asks Socrates, should children be taught, and when? This quickly leads to a discussion of censorship. Socrates cites a number of questionable passages from bulls eye which cannot, he thinks, be allowed in education, since they represent dishonorable behavior and make headway the vexation of death. The dramatic form of much of this poetry is also louche it puts unworthy words into the mouths of gods & heroes.Socrates suggests that what we would call direct quotation mustiness be strictly limited to morally-elevating speech. Nothing can be permitted that compromises the education of the young Guardians, as it is they who will one day rule and protect the city, and whom the lesser-constituted citizens of the polis will attempt to emulate, assimilating, via the imitative process of mimesis, to the Myth (or noble populate) of the Ideal City in which justice is achieved when everyone assumes their proper role in society.The process of mimesis, is, of course, yet some other form of education, in which those of Iron and bronze natures be instructed and inspired by the superior intelligence and character of the property and Silver members of the Guardian class. It is therefore a form of education without which the polis cannot operate. Thus, for Guardian and ordinary citizen alike, the education of the young and the continuing instruction of the citizenry be crucial. In assenting to these aspects, Plato also conceives of another function of education, and one which is quite significant in its relation to Rousseaus views.For Plato, education and ethics are interdependent. To be ethical, in turn, requires a twofold movement movement away from tightness in concrete affairs to thi nking and sight of unchanging order and structures (such as justice) and then movement back from dialectic to participation and re-attachment in worldly affairs. It is a temptation to become an abstract scholar. But the vision of the good is the vision of what is good for oneself and the city &8212 of the common good.If one does not return to help his fellow valet de chambre beings, he becomes selfish and in time will be less able to see what is good, what is best. An self-giving devotion to the good requires an unselfish devotion to the realization of this good in human affairs. Just as the purpose of understanding order and limits in ones own life is to bring about order and restraint in ones own character and desires, the understanding of justice requires application in the public sphere (through education). A man who forgets the polis is like a man who forgets he has a body.Plato thus advocates educating both the body and the city (for one inescapably both), not turning ones back on them. If education is, for Plato, the means by which man comes to fully realize (through society) his potential as a human being and by which society as a whole is in turn elevated, for Rousseau it is quite the opposite. Education, argues Rousseau, does not elevate the souls of men but rather corrodes them. The noble mimesis which lies at the heart of education in Platos kallipolis is for Rousseau merely a slavish imitation of the tired ideas of antiquity.The ill effects of this imitation are manifold. Firstly, argues Rousseau, when we devote ourselves to the learning of old ideas, we stifle our own creativity and originality. Where is there room for original thought, when, in our incessant efforts to impress one another with our erudition, we are constantly spouting the ideas of others? In a world impeccant of originality, the mark of greatness, intelligence, and virtue is reduced to nothing more than our ability to satisfy others by reciting the wisdom of the past.This emphasis on originality is in marked line of work with Plato, who finds no value in originality, deeming it antithetical to a polis otherwise merge by shared Myths of the Ideal City and of Metals. Rousseau rejects this unity, rightly denouncing it as a form of slavery , in which humanitys inherent capacity for spontaneous, original self-expression is replaced with the yoking. of the point and the will to the ideas of others, who are often long dead.In addition to suppressing the innate human need for originality, education (and the appetite for culture and edification that it engenders) causes us to enshroud ourselves, to mask our true natures, desires, and emotions. We become artificial and shallow, using our social amenities and our knowledge of literature, etc. , to present a lovely but deceptive face to the world, a notion quite at odds with the ideas of Plato.We assume, in Rousseaus words, the appearance of all virtues, without being in self-will of one of them. Finally , argues Rousseau, rather than postureening our minds and bodies and (a critical point) moving us towards that which is ethical, as Plato contends, education and civilization effeminate and weaken us physically and ( maybe close to significantly) mentally, and cause us, in this weakness, to stoop to every manner of depravity and iniquity against one another. External ornaments, writes Rousseau, are no less foreign to virtue, which is the strength and activity of the mind.The honest man is an athlete, who loves to wrestle stark naked he scorns all those vile trappings, which prevent the exertion of his strength, and were, for the most part, invented only to conceal some deformity. Virtue, as opposed to Platos conception, is an action, and results not from the imitation inherent in mimesis, but rather in the activity &8212 in the exercise &8212 of the body, mind and soul. Education, however, demands imitation, demands a modeling upon what has been successful. How, then, do we righ tly assess the merits of education with regard to its it molding of the public character &8212 in its ability to produce good citizens.The answer to this hinges, I submit, on how we choose to define the good citizen. Clearly, if allegiance (or assimilation to a political ideology, or perhaps volunteer servitude) is the hallmark of the good citizen, then we must regard Platos disposition towards education as the proper one. However, obedience, despite its obvious centrality to the smooth operation of society (as we would have social chaos were it completely absent), has its useful limits. Over-assimilation to a political idea or blueprint is every bit as treacherous &8212 indeed, far more so &8212 as the utter under-assimilation of anarchy.For those inclined to quarrel this, I would urge them to review the history of Nazi Germany as perhaps the definitive example of what sad, awful spectacles of injustice we humans are capable of when we trade in our mental and spiritual autonomy for the well-provided apathy and faceless anonymity of the political ideal. Furthermore, if , as Rousseau contends, our civilization is such that, Sincere friendship, real esteem, and perfect confidence in each other are banished from among men, what is the lumber of the society for which education &8212 any modern education &8212 purports to prepares us?When, Jealousy, suspicion, fear coldness, reserve, hate, and fraud lie constantly concealed under a uniform and duplicitous veil of politeness, what is left to us to educate citizens for, other than the pleasure we look to derive in pedantic displays of hoary knowledge? If we remove the niceness from civilization, what remains to us that any education will remedy?